Non-Insane Automatism

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Non insane automatism is unconscious involuntary conduct caused by some external factor where there is no claim of insanity. In general, the defence requires the defendant though capable of action, is not conscious as to what he is doing. It applies in cases, for example, where the defendant has performed an involuntary movement or action as a result of “some failure of the mind not due to disease” (Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 2013 Ed. para.17:84). Where the defendant can demonstrate that his or her actions were involuntary precipitated by some external factor, he or she will have a complete defence and will be acquitted. Where the defence of automatism is raised by the defence, it is the prosecution who must disprove it by showing that the acts were voluntary and that the defendant was conscious in carrying them out (R v Stripp (1979) 69 Cr App R 318).

 

Three requirements must be met: (1) there must be an involuntary act; (2) the involuntary act must have been caused by an external factor; (3) the automatism must not be self-induced.

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Involuntary Act

 

In Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277, the defendant was driving along when suddenly he was attacked by a swarm of bees, causing him to swerve into other cars. The defendant contended that his action was a reflex and that his actions was involuntary. The court concurred with such an argument and the defendant was not criminally liable.

 

In Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963) it was held that:

 

No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context - some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as 'automatism' - means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he was doing … [however] to prevent confusion it is to observed that in the criminal law an act is not to be regarded as a voluntary act simply because the actor does not remember it … nor is an act to be regarded as involuntary simply because the doer could not control his impulse to do it.

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In Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr. App. R. 321 it was held that a defendant will not be able to rely on the defence of automatism where his control is limited. The accused was in a hypoglycaemic state and, during this time, drove erratically from work, hitting another car. He could not remember anything about the journey. He argued automatism. However, his defence argued due to the evidence showing that he had exercised conscious control over his movements by steering his car away from other vehicles.

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The decision in Broome v Perkins was considered harsh, however, was followed in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 3 WLR 982. The accused was driving a lorry down the motorway when he crashed into a car parked on the hard shoulder, subsequently killing two people. Experts stated that he had been put into a trance-like state by repetitive vision of the long flat road which reduced, but did not remove, what he was doing. The defendant was acquired, however, in the Court of Appeal it was held that the trial court was wrong and that driving without awareness is not as a matter of law a state capable of founding a defence of automatism.

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External Cause

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A distinction must be drawn between sane automatism (which is caused by an external factor) and insane automatism (which is caused by an internal factor).

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In cases involving an internal factor, or an internal disease of the mind, the courts have stated that is insanity. It is important to distinguish this. Cases which the defendant has held to be insane include epilepsy (R v Sullivan [1984] A.C. 156) or where a defendant suffers from a sleep-related disorder (R v Burgess [1991] 2 Q.B. 92), both of which were held to be precipitated by internal factors.

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In R v Hennessy [1989] 1 W.L.R 287, the accused’s hyperglycaemia was triggered by an internal factor (his diabeties) and therefore within the legal definition of insanity. However, this should be contrasted with the judgment in R. v Quick (William George) [1973] Q.B. 910, where the accused’s hypoglycaemia was caused by insulin and the fact that he had failed to eat property. As these were external factors, he could raise the defence of automatism.

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Self-induced automatism

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Where the automatism is caused by the defendant’s own fault, then the defence will not be available.

In R. v Bailey (John Graham) [1983] 1 W.L.R. 760, the defendant was a diabetic and attacked and injured his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend during a bout of hypoglycaemia. The defendant had eaten some sugar but no other food beforehand, as he was unwell. The Court of Appeal held that self-induced automatism, other than that due to intoxication, may provide a defence if the defendant’s conduct does not amount to recklessness. In this case, if the defendant was aware that by failing to eat that it would put him into a state and attack someone without realising It, he was reckless and the defence will not be available.

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In situations where a defendant has taken a drug for their soporific or sedative effect, and they go on to commit a crime involuntarily, the defence may be available, providing that they can demonstrate that their reaction to the drug was unexpected. In R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64 it was held that a defendant who relied on automatism due to taking Valium could rely on the defence, despite the fact that a doctor had not prescribed him the drug.

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Insane Automatism

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Insane automatism is a complete defence to a charge where the defendant was insane at the time the actus reus of the offence was comitted. Its application is justified on the basis that he who is not responsible for his actions should not be capable. It may, nevertheless, be appropriate to subject the defendant to a detention.

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The substantive requirements for insanity derive from the 19th century judgment in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl. & R 200; 8 E.R. 71. The defendant, Daniel M'Naghten, was indicted for murder after setting oyut to kill the then Prime Minister, Sir Edward Peel. However, by mistake he killed Peel's secretary, Sir Edward Drummond, by mistake and claimed that he was instructed to kill by the 'voice of god'. At trial, he was acquitted on the grounds of insanity. The requirements are as follows: 

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At the time of commiting the act the defendant was (1) labouring under a defect of reasoning; (2) which had arisen as a result of a disease of the mind; (3) the defendant was unaware of the nature and quality of his act; or (4) if he was in fact aware of what he was doing, that he did not know what the was doing was wrong.

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Diesease of the mind

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To demonstrate that the defendant was suffering from a disease of mind as to impair his or her reasoning, memory and understanding powers, it should be noted that it is immaterial if the condition is curable, incurable transitory, or permanent (R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399).

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Disease of the mind has been held to include:

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• Sleep walking – R v Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92

• Epilepsy – Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386

• Hyperglycaemia – R v Hennessy  [1989] 1 WLR 287

• Arteriosclerosis – R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399

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The defendant was unaware of the nature and qulity of his act

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This ingredient refers to the physical

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This refers to the physical rather than moral quality of the act (per Lord Reading CJ in Codere (1916) 12 Cr App R 21) and according to Lord Diplock in Sullivan [1984] AC 156 at p. 173: 'Addressed to an audience of jurors in the 1980s it might more aptly be expressed as “He did not know what he was doing” '. Clearly this would be satisfied if the accused was unconscious at the time or, even if conscious, thought, to adopt an example quoted by Lord Denning in another context, that he was throwing a log rather than the baby on the fire. Equally clearly, the accused would have a defence of automatism or lack of mens rea respectively in these two situations, and this underlines the point previously made that the M'Naghten rules generally merely qualify what would otherwise be a complete defence.

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